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It may come as a surprise to many of you to see a title like this coming from me 
as my Presidential Address. To tell you the truth, I have been toying with many 
ideas until last week when I finally decided to deliver my address on this topic. 
My decision is certainly not a demographic decision, but it is a decision driven 
mostly by its aptness to honor the contributions made not only by our honoree, 
Doug Norris, but also by many of us during our lifetime. Although at first sight 
the topic doesn’t seem to be related to mathematical demography, all the ideas I 
am  sharing with you today are coming from the rich research experience of 
demographers, in particular mathematical demographers. 
I decided to speak on this topic because of the recent events in demographic 
research  circles  in  Canada.  You  may  be  aware  of  the  contributions  the 
demographers  are  making  toward  Canadian  social  policies  through  the 
workshops  and  conferences  organized  by  Human  Resources  and  Social 
Development Canada (HRSDC) and Policy Research Initiative (PRI) during the 
past few months. We are happy to see this turn of events, especially among the 
government agencies to listen to what demographers have to say. At the same 
time I am a bit concerned too because of what we have learned from the history 
of our neighboring country south of the border. Let me say a few words about 
that history to inform those who are not aware of it and to remind those who 
already know it.  Demographic Decisions and Demographic Well-Being 
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It was in the year 1969 when the then US President Richard Nixon convened the 
Rockefeller  Commission  on  Population  Growth  and  the  American  Future  to 
evaluate the challenges posed by continued population growth in the US. In his 
speech to the Congress, Nixon said “…perhaps the most dangerous element in 
the present situation is the fact that so few people are examining these questions 
from the viewpoint of the whole society… In the governmental sphere, there is 
virtually no machinery through which we can develop a detailed understanding 
of demographic changes and bring that understanding to bear on public policy” 
(Nixon, 1969; italics mine). Such a wonderful testimony to the important role of 
demography in public policy simply could not have come from a politician. I am 
sure a demographer should have written it. I would strongly encourage you to 
read it, if you have not already done so. What happened after that remarkable 
speech by Nixon is history. Three years after Nixon’s speech, the Rockefeller 
commission  came  with  its  many  recommendations,  at  least  two  of  which 
(universal  access  to  contraception  and  liberalizing  abortion  laws)  were 
politically  abhorrent  to  Nixon  who  dismissed  entirely  the  work  of  the 
Commission. Charles Westoff, the executive director of the Commission wrote 
in the journal Population Index (1973:501) that ”The President’s response issued 
in May 1972 was a disappointment at every level….In effect, the responses were 
narrowly political and greatly at variance with the concerns about population 
that the President had expressed less than three years earlier”. History is known 
to  repeat  itself.  But  I  hope  we  will  not  face  a  similar  situation,  given  the 
changing political landscape of Canada today. 
We should be glad about the turn of events at the federal agencies and we hope 
that same interest will permeate the policy making agencies in the provinces. 
Policy  makers  are  becoming  more  aware  of  the  importance  of  studying  the 
demographic changes and their implications for social policies. In a way, policy 
makers  are  beginning  to  realize  that  “Demography,  the  study  of  human 
populations, is the most powerful – and most underutilized – tool we have to 
understand the past and to foretell the future. Demographics affect every one of 
us as individuals, far more than most of us have ever imagined. They also play a 
pivotal role in the economic and social life of our country.” (Foot, 1998:2). 
 
Following Hauser and Duncan (1959:2), we are used to defining demography in 
our lectures as “the study of the size, territorial distribution, and composition of 
population, changes therein, and the components of such changes”. It is fitting 
that this definition includes two important phrases - “composition of population” 
and “changes therein”. These two phrases broaden demography to encompass 
many disciplines and we are often proud to say that Demography is essentially 
interdisciplinary.  Despite  the  sometimes  acrimonious  academic  squabbles 
between demographers and sociologists seen in some university departments, it 
is hard to imagine whether social science – any social science, for that matter - Fernando Rajulton 
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can advance at all as a science without first knowing the basic information about 
the human population that it studies.  
 
 
Demographic Decisions 
 
Composition  of  a  population  and  changes  therein  essentially  imply  that 
individuals in a population or a society are making decisions in their daily lives 
that affect the composition of the population in many ways. As we know only 
too well, it is the day-to-day demographic decisions of individuals in a society - 
let me stress the term “demographic” here because not many think of it that way 
– that shape and determine not only the three basic components of population 
growth,  namely  fertility,  mortality  and  migration  but  also  all  other  related 
behaviors.  
 
People make a variety of demographic decisions for many reasons. Mortality 
seems to be an exception, at least until now.  Except for a few who approach 
Doctor Death or commit suicide, people do not decide to die, not only because 
nobody willingly likes to die but also because whether we like it or not, we all 
die anyway. Otherwise in all other spheres of life, which can be classified into 
three  main  forms,  namely  the  Self,  the  Intimate  and  the  Social  (McDonald, 
1996), people make decisions all the time. People decide to migrate looking for 
greener pastures to improve their lives. People decide to marry, cohabit or form 
a couple relationship, whether of the same or opposite sex.  People decide to 
have children or not, which in our times is more than ever closely associated 
with the idea of liberation, especially of women. [Just a few days ago I heard the 
expression “childless” has fallen out of use in Europe; people prefer to use the 
expression “childfree” instead – well, what a great liberation!] People decide to 
divorce and remarry. The Federal Act of Divorce 1968 had spelled out several 
conditions for hearing the case for divorce such as adultery, mental or physical 
cruelty, homosexual conduct, addiction to alcohol or narcotics and separation for 
three years or desertion for five years. A divorce was granted in two steps and 
the second step, the decree, was necessary for remarriage. The Divorce Act of 
1985  simplified  everything.  Divorce  is  granted  on  only  one  condition: 
breakdown  of  marriage,  established  by  proof  of  adultery,  mental  or  physical 
cruelty, or separation for one year. The impact of this change in the Divorce Act 
is quite clear. When I was coming by bus yesterday to York University from the 
Downsview metro station, I saw several ads at a bus stop. There were ads like 
“Quick  driving  test”,  “Quick  BA  Diploma”,  and  so  on.  And  I  noticed 
surprisingly an ad that read “Quick Divorce - from $300”. The point here is that 
social policies have tremendous impact on people’s demographic decisions. We 
shall come back to this point later. 
  Demographic Decisions and Demographic Well-Being 
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Over the past three decades, changes in social attitudes, family laws and social 
security provisions have led to significant changes in the way people make their 
demographic  decisions.  These  demographic  decisions  can  create  all  the 
differences  in  a  nation  and  between  nations.  Small  changes  introduced  by 
demographic  decisions  that  people  make  daily  can  accumulate  over  time, 
introduce  further  changes  in  social  attitudes  and  behavior,  thus  eventually 
creating  a  “distinct”  society  or  nation.  Changes  in  patterns  of  marriage  and 
fertility or, in general, family transformations that we witness today, are actually 
the accumulated outcomes of millions of personal demographic decisions made 
by men and women of past generations. In a recent paper that examines the so-
called  “fertility  divide”  among  Canadian  and  American  women,  Torrey  and 
Eberstadt (2005) point out that differences in fertility in Canada and the US may 
say  less  about  the  future  than  about  the  present.  These  two  societies  are 
becoming different at the same time as their economies integrate and become 
more interdependent. Why then the fertility divide? The answer lies in the fact 
that the “basic rhythms of private lives are diverging as women in Canada enter 
common-law unions more often, wait longer than American women to marry, 
and have children later and less often”. We know fertility is a leading indicator 
of  other  changes  taking  place  in  a  society.  If  the  North  American  fertility 
divergence  continues,  Canada  and  the  US  may  become  an  example  of  how 
countries can converge at the macroeconomic level while diverging at the micro 
level of individuals and families. Micro- and macro-economic explanations of 
demographic behavior, in particular fertility behavior, might have helped us to 
explain historical transitions in the past but their explanatory power becomes 
minimal beyond a certain threshold of development and individualism.  
 
 
Demographic Well-Being 
 
Like all decisions, demographic decisions have a future orientation and impact. 
We have expectations or hopes about how a specific demographic decision that 
we make will affect our  lives. In general, we do not  think about how  these 
decisions will affect our society at large. Some of these demographic decisions 
are definitely at the top of the list in terms of our own well-being and purpose in 
life. Forming and dissolving couple relationships, having children and moving to 
greener pastures are certainly important life events that enrich our own well-
being and purpose  in life. We are more than  willing to  “grin and bear” any 
hardships or difficulties that may accompany these decisions and to go through 
any amount of social adjustment associated with those decisions. What we do 
not normally think about is the fact that these demographic decisions not only 
enrich our own well-being and purpose in life but they enrich also the well-
being of the society we live in. It is this well-being of the society at large that I 
am calling here “demographic well-being”.  Fernando Rajulton 
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You  may  be  wondering  why  I  am  interested  in  thinking  about  demographic 
well-being.  It  all  started  with  the  discussion  the  group  of  demographers  at 
Western  had  a  few  months  ago  over  the  life  course  framework  we  were 
proposing to PRI. Connecting the different life events, we were brainstorming 
about what these events finally lead to. Then, all of us agreed that all life events 
eventually lead to our well-being. It is certainly a good idea. Since then I have 
been  musing  about  what  sort  of  well-being  are  we  really  thinking  of?  This 
presidential address is the outcome of my musing over the last few weeks. Not 
all ideas can be expressed in a short time allocated to this address, but I shall be 
content with pointing out a few directions for others to pursue. 
First, that there is something like demographic well-being is not usually said or 
heard in our discourses or research works except for implicit implications of 
what would happen if that demographic well-being is not there, for example, an 
ageing society. Do we need a new expression “demographic well-being” at all?  
Why  can’t  we  be  simply  happy  with  the  term  already  in  use  such  as,  for 
example, social well-being? Or, do not the two terms - social and demographic 
well-being - mean the same thing? You may think otherwise. But I am here 
arguing for using the term “demographic well-being” (DWB), because the well-
being that follows demographic decisions has a unique characteristic that is not 
found in other types of well-being, say social well-being. Decisions made by us 
as individuals are personal and demographic, they are not personal and social. 
Times are gone when demographic decisions were considered to be social. For 
example, in the past a marriage was considered to be, not so much a personal 
decision;  it  was  fundamentally  a  family  or  social  decision.  So  too  was 
childbearing. In our times, demographic decisions have become more and more 
personal, based on personal autonomy, growth and fulfillment. In fact, societies 
(especially  developed  societies)  have  made  various  accommodations  in  their 
legal  and  constitutional  rights  of  individuals  such  that  these  decisions  have 
become more and more personal and “individualistic”, no longer “social”. As I 
am  going  to  say  later,  societies  have  experimented  with  this  as  a  sort  of 
“solution” to the problems raised by changing demographic decisions of people.  
 
Second, I prefer to use the term “demographic well-being” because it exists in 
its own right. It is not the same thing as “social well-being”. Rather, if we think 
carefully, demographic  well-being (DWB)  leads to  social well-being (SWB). 
SWB follows DWB, not the other way.  
 
Third,  I  am  arguing  for  using  the  expression  DWB  not  only  because  of  my 
professional  bias  towards  demography  (which  should  be  obvious!)  but  also 
because of my personal, professional bias toward putting other expressions of 
well-being in their proper place, especially those that have been overemphasized Demographic Decisions and Demographic Well-Being 
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in our daily thinking, reading and living. This point may become clear with what 
I have to say in the following paragraphs. 
 
I was curious to find out the number of instances the expression “demographic 
well-being” is used at all in any literature. I searched through the web pages and 
went  through  so  many  papers,  scientific  and  nonscientific.  I  found  only  a 
handful  of  instances  where  the  expression  “demographic  well-being”  is 
explicitly used. To my surprise and delight, one of these instances is the web 
page  maintained  by  the  province  of  Newfoundland  and  Labrador  which 
mentions  clearly  the  province’s  programs  are  geared  toward  the  “social  and 
demographic well-being” of people (see, for example, the province’s web page 
at http://www.releases.gov.nl.ca/releases/2002/exec/0916n05.htm). 
 
Researchers use  the term  “well-being” under many aspects.   The  most often 
used expression is economic well-being; in fact, “well-being” is simply equated 
to “economic well-being”, nothing else matters. We can also hear frequently in 
discussions and research papers the term well-being used exclusively to imply 
health,  in  particular  physical  health.  Beyond  the  health  aspect,  we  hear  of 
“psychological  well-being”,  “consumer  well-being”,  “emotional  well-being”, 
“subjective well-being”, “sexual well-being”, and, somewhat rarely compared to 
others,  “social  well-being”  (implying  mostly  participation,  belonging  and 
tolerance).  These  different  aspects  of  well-being  are  certainly  not  mutually 
exclusive; they often overlap; so too research on well-being. We can add to this 
list any number of other aspects of well-being. But personally, perhaps because 
of my professional bias again, I prefer to look at them all as offshoots of DWB 
because none of them can exist without DWB.  
In  the  current  literature  on  well-being,  economic  well-being  is  the  most 
frequently  talked  about,  no  wonder  because  of  the  obsession  with  economic 
growth and the money it would bring into our pockets. Politicians do not hesitate 
to talk about the “money in your pockets”, and two to four hundred dollars more 
in people’s pockets seem to sway their votes from one political party to another. 
Our economy has recently shown good signs of growth which may continue 
sometime into the foreseeable future. But has it really improved the economic 
well-being of Canadians? Many studies indeed show a decline in well-being, not 
only economic but also social and other aspects of well-being.  
Consider,  for  example,  the  persistent  economic  or  income  disparity  among 
families that many research papers talk about. Since 1970s, the rich are getting 
richer and the poor are getting poorer. Real average family income has definitely 
increased over  time (30 to 40%), however this increase  is not spread evenly 
across all families. (Statistics Canada, 1999). What is important to stress here is 
the difference in income disparity has to do with the demographic changes in Fernando Rajulton 
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family structure and the changing nature of families. Thus, in the 70s, those 
aged 65 dominated the bottom decile of income; extreme poverty was a problem 
of the old. In 1995 and thereafter, the elderly had been replaced by female single 
parents,  who  accounted  for  24%  of  the  bottom  decile  in  the  seventies  but  a 
whopping 40 percent in 1995.  
 
In  general,  the  so-called  “economic  explanations”  of  demographic  decisions 
with which we  are only too familiar, have not ultimately explained much of 
demographic  decisions  after  all.  Consider  all  the  economic  explanations 
researchers  have  explored  to  explain  fertility,  for  example.  As  pointed  out 
earlier, two nations can converge economically but at the same time diverge in 
their value systems and hence in their fertility. I am personally glad to see that 
more  recent  demographic  research  works  try  to  de-emphasize  the  economic 
rational choice theory and to focus more on social and psychological theories of 
demographic  behavior  (see,  for  example,  the  program  on  Institutional  and 
Political Approaches to Family and Fertility Dynamics at Max Planck Institute 
for  Demographic  Research,  Rostock,  available  at 
http://www.demogr.mpg.de/general/structure/division2/lab-ceffd/49.htm].  I  am 
not saying that economic factors do not at all play their role in demographic 
decisions,  far  from  it.  But,  to  give  such  an  important  place  to  economic 
rationality is unwise and fruitless.  
 
 
Implications of Demographic Decisions and Demographic Well-Being 
 
What then are the implications if we talk about demographic well-being ensuing 
from demographic decisions? The first obvious implication is the way we try to 
explain demographic decisions. As said earlier, individual choice and decisions 
cannot  be  simply  considered  as  the  rational  man  maximizing  his  “utility”, 
whatever that ambiguous term may mean. Rather, they need to be considered 
within the “cultural” or “sociodemographic” context in which the decisions are 
made. This context may include hard to measure factors such as power, status, 
politics, networks, values, social policies, and so on.   
 
The second implication is the greater role the age structure should play in our 
research. The unique way of capturing the changes introduced by demographic 
decisions is to study the age structure changes, classified by various dimensions 
of well-being one can see as relevant. As we are all aware, declining fertility, 
not  so  much  declining  mortality,  has  far-reaching  ripple  effects  on  the  age 
structure.  They  touch  on  all  age-specific  activities  and  programs  throughout 
society. Here is the age structure of Canadian population from Census 2001 (see 
Figure 1). Instead of just looking at the age structure for the whole population, 
let us look at it, for example, by immigrant status (for simplicity, born in Canada  Demographic Decisions and Demographic Well-Being 
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and born outside Canada). It is striking that the proportions in the younger age 
groups among the Canadian-born are higher than those among the foreign-born. 
Note that these Canadian-born include children born to the foreign-born as well. 
In  contrast,  the  proportions  of  foreign-born  children  and  young  adults  are 
remarkably lower than the overall age structure. Above age 18, the Canadian-
born  age  structure  and  the  total  population’s  age  structure  almost  perfectly 
coincide.  We  can  also  note  the  remarkable  contributions  made  by  the  adult 
foreign-born to the age structure of the Canadian population.  
 
As  a  second  example,  if  one  is  interested  in  the  economic  aspect  of  age 
structure, one can look at the age structure by employment status (see Figure 2). 
The picture is quite interesting and calls for more serious examination in terms 
of demographic well-being of Canadians, not only in the present but also in the 
future.  
 
Talking about the age structure, an important question for further research would 
be:  Is  there  then  anything  like  an  “optimal  age  structure”?  This  question 
resembles the question that has been debated for centuries in human history, 
namely the optimum population size. But it is not simply an optimum size that 
we are talking about here, rather the question is about an optimum age structure. 
It would be worth investigating further the optimum age structure with respect to 
certain key aspects of well-being. An interesting case would be, for example, 
what would be the optimal age structure that would enable us to preserve the 
social benefits well into old age. As far as I know, there was only one study 
published  more  than  two  decades  ago,  by  Martin  Feldstein  of  Harvard 
University, that examined a point somewhat related to this.  
 
I  would  like  to  emphasize  here  that  the  concept  of  optimal  age  structure  is 
different  from  what  some  researchers  are  talking  about  these  days  as 
“demographic gift”- an expression referring to the age structure found in many 
developing  countries,  consisting  of  relatively  fewer  dependent  children  and 
relatively few elderly, but with a larger share of working age population (Bloom 
and Williamson,1998; Birdsall et al., 2001). During the IUSSP conference in 
Tours  I  heard  this  expression  so  often  used  by  researchers  from  developing 
countries, particularly from Africa. They all express an optimistic view that such 
an age structure is a “blessing” to their developing countries unlike the problems 
faced by developed societies. No, such an inference is  a  bit naïve,  if such a 
“demographic gift” is not going to be accompanied by other aspects of well-
being as well, besides the fact that with declining fertility such a “gift” can only 
be considered as a temporary phenomenon.  Demographic Decisions and Demographic Well-Being 
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The third implication is that people themselves are ultimately responsible to bear 
the  future  implications  of  their  own  demographic  decisions  in  terms  of 
demographic  well-being. An interesting and current phenomenon that we  are 
witnessing today is what the baby boomers are experiencing and are going to 
experience in the future. As Easterlin, Schaefer, and Macunovich (1993) argued 
more than a decade ago, the baby boomers delayed marriage (or never married) 
and  had  fewer  children  in  order  to  narrow  the  gap  between  their  real  and 
expected levels of income (compared to their parents’ income).  The important 
demographic decision the baby boomers made, namely increasing participation 
of women in the labor force and forgoing childbirth, obviously helped them to 
become  markedly  better-off  economically  than  their  predecessors.  But  as 
Easterlin  and colleagues argued, they may have sacrificed their demographic 
well-being  in  order  to  achieve  their  economic  prosperity  or  economic  well-
being.  “In  effect,  an  improvement  in  the  economic  status  over  that  of  their 
parents was purchased at the expense of family life” (p. 513). The baby boomers 
were  and  are  economically  better-off  but  they  are  poorer  in  terms  of 
demographic well-being. Therefore, a large number of baby boomers will be 
forced to face retirement without the financial and emotional support of adult 
children  or  a  spouse. They  are  responsible  for  the  DWB  they  have  created 
through their own demographic decisions. No society and no government can be 
expected  to  perform  miracles  in  the  absence  of  DWB  without  adversely 
affecting the DWB of future generations. 
The fourth implication is the role of policies for DWB. Most policy makers in 
developed  societies  like  Canada  consider  “tampering”  with  people’s 
demographic decision-making anathema to the democratic process. Our political 
systems and policy making bodies are under the impression that demographic 
decisions  are  made  exclusively  by  individuals  without  any  influence  from 
government policies. This becomes quite evident when we discuss with policy 
makers. But there is an irony here. While childbearing is considered a deeply 
personal matter that is resolved only in the “bedrooms of a nation” or that should 
be left entirely to the individuals and not to governments, the other demographic 
processes, especially mortality/health and migration, are very much the concern 
of  governments.  By  refusing  to  engage  in  all  demographic  decision  making 
processes, many are blind to the future consequences of these processes, hence 
of demographic well-being, affected by all policies that have indirect impact on 
people’s  demographic  decisions  every  day.  All  policies,  whether  explicitly 
demographic or not,  are  implicitly demographic, and  they all have enormous 
demographic consequences for the future. It is worrisome then that most policies 
occur in our country without proper demographic scrutiny. Sometimes we wish 
that  while  framing  policies,  politicians  would  think  more  about  future 
consequences of  the demographic decisions of  today  than their own partisan 
convictions and conventions.  Demographic Decisions and Demographic Well-Being 
  150 
 
Peter  Hicks,  before  becoming  the  Assistant  Deputy  Minister  of  Social 
Development Canada, wrote a report on Preparing for Tomorrow’s Social Policy 
Agenda (Hicks, 2002). In that report, he suggested in Section 5 titles “Planning 
for an uncertain future: Three scenarios” that policy research and development 
be  consistent  with  a  wide  range  of  plausible  future  policy  directions.  The 
development  work  he  proposed  in  that  report  touched  on  three  different 
scenarios about the future. The third scenario he proposed was what he called 
“Life Is Citizenship”. This scenario puts more  emphasis on the interrelations 
among the various domains of life, “including caregiving and the non-market 
domains  of  society  as  well  as  greater  collective  effort  in  building  social 
infrastructure,  particularly  around  housing  and  caregiving  of  children  and 
seniors, including a concern about fertility levels” (p.15)  
 
These various domains of life as citizens are what are ultimately meant by the 
expression DWB. Whenever I teach courses in demography, at the beginning of 
the course, I define demography, as we all do, using the above quoted Duncan 
and  Hauser’s  words.  And  then,  I  tell  students  what  the  word  “demography” 
ultimately means. Summarizing all the debates over the centuries about human 
population,  I  learned  the  Chinese  had  a  wonderful  way  of  expressing  what 
“demography”  or  simply  “population”  means.  Here  is  the  Chinese  word  for 
population – rán kău - a pictograph (see Figure 3), that tells us what exactly 
demography is all about. Demography = Person + a mouth to feed + a house to 
shelter.  Policies  need  to  address  these  two  domains  first,  namely  food  and 
housing.  Peter  Hicks  mentioned  them  in  the  Report.  I  am  afraid,  they 
unfortunately stay on the report.  
 
Food banks and shelters for the homeless are reporting conspicuous increase in 
the  number  of  people  who  need  their  support.  It  would  be  worthwhile  to 
examine seriously the trends in these two basic aspects of DWB. Even if people 
have their homes, the question of affordability is a more serious concern than 
ever. In a study that I did recently on housing and housing conditions in Canada 
using  the  2001  Census,  it  was  clear  that  only  three  fourths  of  Canadian 
households meet the affordability criterion (defined as spending less than 30% 
of before-tax household income on shelter costs). Eighty-four percent of owners 
spend less than 30% of their incomes on housing, while only sixty percent of 
renters do so (see Table 1). Further, variations by household type or by family 
structure  are  once  again  apparent  here.  Challenges  in  providing  affordable 
housing to all citizens of the country are many. But one is struck with the silence 
on the part of governments, either federal or provincial, on this primary DWB, 
especially in many of Canada’s major urban centres.   
 Fernando Rajulton 
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I do not mean to criticize the policy making processes in our nation. In fact, if 
we study the past, we cannot but admire how our society and social policies over 
time have made various adjustments to find a societal solution to the conflict 
people  experience  in  their  day-to-day  life  because  of  their  demographic 
decisions. Our social policies have indeed tried to find a societal solution to this 
increased conflict, to ameliorate the impact of this conflict. Greater flexibility in 
the ways we can arrange or break our relationships, newer and greater support in 
combining work and family responsibilities, tolerance of alternative lifestyles 
are all major social changes brought about by various social policies in Canada. 
At  the  same  time,  however,  it  is  good  to  study  in  depth  what  kind  of 
demographic well-being do these changes entail for the future. As said earlier, 
these changes have far lasting consequences.  
 
To summarize the ideas that I have shared with you here, let me put it this way. 
We are at a point in history when demographic decisions and demographic well-
being are in our own hands, not in the hands of policy makers, and not in the 
hands of governments. And, it is important for all of us to bear in mind that our 
demographic decisions of today will make the destiny of our nation tomorrow. 
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